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Country Profil

Yugoslavia

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY

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GENERAL SURVEY CHAPTERS

COUNTRY PROFILE Integrated perspective of the subject country • Chronology • Area brief • Summary map

THE SOCIETY Social structure • Population • Labor • Health • Living conditions • Social problems • Religion • Education • Public information • Artistic expression

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS Political evolution of the state • Governmental strength and stability • Structure and function • Political dynamics • National policies • Threats to stability • The police • Intelligence and security • Countersubversion and counterinsurgency capabilities

THE ECONOMY Appraisal of the economy • Its structure—agriculture, fisheries, forestry, fuels and power, metals and minerals, manufacturing and construction • Domestic trade • Economic policy and development • International economic relations

TRANSPORTATION AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS Appraisal of systems • Strategic mobility • Railroads • Highways • Inland waterways • Pipelines • Ports • Merchant marine • Civil air • Airfields • The telecom system

MILITARY GEOGRAPHY Topography and climate • Military geographic regions • Strategic areas • Internal routes • Approaches: land, sea, air

ARMED FORCES The defense establishment • Joint activities • Ground forces • Naval forces • Air forces • Paramilitary

SCIENCE Level of scientific advancement • Organization, planning, and financing of research • Scientific education, manpower, and facilities • Major research fields

This General Survey supersedes the one dated August 1969, copies of which should be destroyed.

Country Profile: YUGOSLAVIA

This Country Profile was prepared for the NIS by the Central Intelligence Agency. Research was substantially completed by November 1972.

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

Tito's Yugoslavia:

A Turbulent Society in Transition

Yugoslavia is a country with a painful history and a troubled present. Its territory has been an arena of conflict between rival empires—temporal and spiritual—since the dawn of the Christian era. Its people are for the most part descendants of Slavic tribes that migrated into the Balkan area some 13 or 14 hundred years ago. But prior to December 1918, when the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was established on the ruins of the Habsburg and Ottoman empires, they were never joined together in a single state. Centuries of foreign domination and repeated upheaval have left them deeply divided by differences in religion, nationality, language, political experience, and economic development. (U/OU)

Yugoslavia's survival as a multinational state has, in fact, been one of the minor miracles of our times. Ever since 1918 the Yugoslavs have been wrestling with the difficult problems of modernizing their backward economy, of protecting themselves against pressures and intrigues born of the hegemonistic or irredentist aspirations of outside powers, and of forging a united nation out of people previously separated—and sometimes set against each other—by geography, historical circumstance, and cultural influence. In none of these areas have they been wholly successful. (U/OU)

GRGUR NINSKI MONUMENT
Split, Yugoslavia

This heroic statue of Gregory of Nin, a 10th Century Croatian bishop who fought for the use of his native language and script in church services, is the work of the late Ivan Mestrovic, Yugoslavia's most famous sculptor. It stands outside a great palace built by the Roman Emperor Diocletian nearly 16 hundred years ago.

The monument was completed during the reign of King Alexander and erected in its present location by the Tito regime. Its subject and setting capture the full sweep of the region's turbulent history and, like the life of the peasant-born Mestrovic (who worked actively for the creation of a Yugoslav state only to become one of his country's most prominent expatriates), the fierce nationalism which has sometimes united and sometimes divided the Yugoslav peoples.

Birth and Rebirth

The decision to alter the complex political geography of the Balkans in the name of self-determination presented the bealeaguered elder statesmen at the Versailles Conference with one of their more challenging tasks. The new country which emerged from their endeavors was composed of seven disparate elements: the independent kingdom of Serbia (including that part of Macedonia gained during the Balkan Wars); the independent kingdom of Montenegro; Croatia-Slavonia (formerly a semiautonomous area under Hungarian rule); Vojvodina, plus two small districts between Slovenia and Hungary (previously integral parts of Hungary); the Slovene lands (long Austrian provinces); Dalmatia (an Austrian province of predominantly Croatian inhabitants); and Bosnia and Hercegovina (formerly administered jointly by Austria and Hungary). While somewhat outnumbered by their partners, the Serbs alone had an extensive and relatively well-developed governmental system. Fiercely proud of their role in the wars which had freed the Balkans from foreign domination, and moved by visions of a greater Serbian kingdom, they managed to reserve the dominant role in the new state for themselves. (U/OU)

The years of the monarchy (U/OU)

Although the dream of a union of South Slavs had been gaining force among Balkan intellectuals and politicians since the early 19th century, the birth of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was anything but smooth. Organization of the new state as a constitutional monarchy under Serbian leadership frustrated those non-Serbs—particularly the Croats—who had hoped to play a more significant role in provincial and national affairs. Internal wrangling and border disputes with Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, Italy, and Albania delayed promulgation of the country's first constitution until mid-1921. The fledgling parliamentary system it created, shaky from the outset and operating within an increasingly heated political environment, collapsed less than 8 years later. In January 1929, King Alexander suspended the constitution and began a period of dictatorship which lasted until his sudden death in 1934.

During his rule, Alexander sought to unify his troubled country by attacking the organizational and territorial foundations of ethnic particularism and by intensifying efforts to foster a sense of pride in, and identity with, the nation as a whole. To these ends he changed the name of the state to the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and replaced its former provinces with nine regions, which, in many cases, cut across ethnic and historical boundaries. He banned the existing political parties and ethnic societies as well as all organizations suspected of opposing the idea of a unitary Yugoslav state. By his order, only the Yugoslav state flag was permitted for public display. But Alexander's reforms skirted the key issue of Serbian hegemony. Thus, although he eventually restored a quasi-parliamentary system of government, his efforts to impose unity from above and to strengthen centralized control from the capital at Belgrade only fueled domestic discontent.

Internal tensions were further aggravated by the impact of falling prices for Yugoslav agricultural produce and by the activities of various extremist groups who found sanctuary and support in Italy, Hungary, and Bulgaria. By 1934, Alexander seemed to be considering some sort of constitutional accommodation with his non-Serbian subjects, but his assassination in Marseille at the hands of Croatian terrorists ushered in a new period of immobility in Belgrade. Alexander's son, Peter, was only 11 years old. Prince Paul, dominant member of the regency council which was established to govern in Peter's name, maintained that fundamental changes in the existing system must be postponed until the young prince reached majority. Thus Paul retained the more repressive aspects of Alexander's domestic policies while concentrating on strengthening Yugoslavia's precarious international position. Under his leadership, Belgrade edged away from reliance on the Little Entente and the Balkan Pact as a defensive bulwark against the revisionist powers of the interwar period and sought security in rapprochement with Italy, Germany, and Bulgaria.

This change in foreign policy posture was generally unpopular, adding a new dimension to internal discontent. And by the summer of 1939 the rapidly deteriorating situation in Europe had convinced Paul of the urgency of putting his domestic house in order. Abandoning its previous insistence on a unitary state, the Belgrade regime reached an agreement with Croatian leaders whereby the regions of Sava and Gornje Primorje were combined into an autonomous Banat of Croatia. The agreement pleased the Croats but annoyed almost everyone else. In any event, it came too late to have a salutary effect. World War II broke out within a week. Eighteen months later, Paul's efforts to stave off disaster by bowing to Hitler's demand that Belgrade adhere to the Tripartite Pact



The Bosnian town of Jajce, birthplace of Yugoslavia's post-World War II political order

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resulted in a coup d'etat which brought the still underage Peter to the throne and which precipitated a German blitzkrieg on Yugoslavia.

Divided and demoralized, the Yugoslav army capitulated after only 11 days of fighting. Peter and his ministers fled, first to Palestine and then to London, and the Kingdom of Yugoslavia disappeared from the map. With the blessings of Italy and Germany, Ante Pavelic (leader of the *Ustashi*, the Croatian nationalist group responsible for the assassination of King Alexander) established a nominally independent Croatian state embracing most of the former Banat of Croatia plus Bosnia and Hercegovina. The remainder of the country was divided up by Germany, Italy, Hungary, Bulgaria, and the Italian puppet state of Albania and was either annexed outright or administered through collaborationist regimes.

As the Axis powers soon found out, however, the Yugoslavs are a stubborn lot. By mid-1941 there were two major resistance groups operating against the invaders: the predominantly Serbian Chetniks headed by Col. Draza Mihailovic (subsequently named by King Peter as Minister of Defense and commander in chief of the Royal Armed Forces) and the more broadly based Partisans, raised and controlled by the Yugoslav Communist Party under the leadership of the then unknown Josip Broz Tito. But enemy occupation, coupled with the brutal campaign of terror waged by Pavelic's minions against the hapless Serbian minority in Croatian lands, also released ethnic hatreds and antagonisms that had been building up for years. The Yugoslavs shortly found themselves engaged on two fronts: in a struggle for national liberation and in a bloody civil war.

Of the staggering total of over 1.7 million Yugoslavs who perished in the years from 1941 to 1945, more than half died at the hands of their fellow countrymen. During the course of this bloodbath, some Chetnik units collaborated with occupation and quisling forces in operations against the Partisans, thereby severely compromising Mihailovic (and through association, the royal government he represented) in the eyes of much of the population. Taking advantage of the fact that popular sentiment was swinging in their favor, the Partisans began active preparations for a new postwar political order in November 1942. Stalin, fearful of an adverse reaction in London and Washington, attempted to dissuade Tito from this course of action. But less than 2 years later, the Western allies—impressed with the tenacity of Partisan resistance activities and increasingly disillusioned with Mihailovic—threw their full support behind Tito and forced King Peter to negotiate an agreement with the Communist leader that virtually assured the collapse of the Yugoslav monarchy.

In accordance with this agreement, a provisional government was established in Belgrade in March 1945. It included three members of King Peter's exile regime and five representatives of prewar political parties. But Tito and his lieutenants held all the key posts, and their Partisan movement was in undisputed control of the country. Less than 9 months later, carefully managed elections gave Tito the popular mandate he needed to legitimize and consolidate his position. The royalist representatives were forced out of the government and placed under house arrest. The newly elected Constituent Assembly promptly abolished the monarchy, proclaimed the establishment of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, and on 31 January 1946 approved a new constitution patterned closely after the existing Soviet model. Embodying the federal formula which Tito had advanced more than 2 years earlier as the most promising solution to the problem of ethnic and regional rivalries, the 1946 Constitution established six constituent republics corresponding to traditional divisions of the country (Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Hercegovina, Montenegro, and Macedonia) as well as an autonomous province (Vojvodina) and an autonomous region (Kosovo-Metohija) within the republic of Serbia. Yugoslavia was, in effect, reborn under Marxist rule. And with this event its people entered a period of rapid change, experimentation, and uncertainty from which they have yet to emerge.

Postwar Yugoslavia (S)

Yugoslavia came out of World War II as much of a Balkan backwater as it had been during the early days of Alexander's rule. Three out of four Yugoslavs were still engaged in agricultural pursuits. Illiteracy remained high. Such new railroads, highways, and factories as had been built during the interwar years had been heavily damaged. Many of the country's most able professional personnel and technicians had been killed or had fled abroad. But what its new leaders lacked in experience, they more than made up in revolutionary zeal. Fired by memories of wartime successes in the face of nearly impossible odds and borrowing heavily from the rigidly centralized Stalinist system, they set their sights on transforming Yugoslavia into a self-sufficient, industrial, and thoroughly socialist country by 1952. In the mistaken belief that Stalin would hasten both to support their

domestic programs and to defend their interests on the international front, they reversed Yugoslavia's prewar Westward orientation and moved to bind Belgrade economically, politically, and militarily to Moscow. Indeed, Yugoslavia was one of the West's most active and brash antagonists during the early days of the cold war.

The Soviet-Yugoslav honeymoon was shortlived, however. Independent, self-confident, and understandably proud of the fact that they had come to power with little help from the Soviet army, Yugoslavia's Communist leaders reacted sharply to Soviet efforts to gain control over their country's political and economic affairs. Moreover, Belgrade entertained ambitions in the Balkan area which not only clashed with Moscow's own goals but served as a constant source of embarrassment in the Kremlin's dealings with the West. In 1948, Tito's defiant attitude led to the expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Soviet bloc. In the face of mounting Soviet economic, political, and military pressure designed to topple the Tito regime, Belgrade began to seek new ways to win popular acceptance, to stimulate economic growth, and to provide for Yugoslavia's security.

In late 1949, Yugoslavia espoused its now well-known policy of nonalignment, thereby opening the way for Western support in times of need while retaining maximum flexibility in the conduct of its foreign affairs. Shortly thereafter, Belgrade launched a blistering attack on the Soviet Union's sacred Stalinist system and announced that Yugoslavia would embark on a "separate road to socialism," one which would relax the harsher aspects of Communist rule and eventually lead to that ultimate, elusive Marxist goal: the withering away of the state. Since setting that course, Yugoslavia has been an unusual laboratory of statecraft. It is a Communist state in name and theory, but in practice it is a fully independent country which has rejected most of the "socialist experience" of other states, including the U.S.S.R., and which is deliberately removing its economy from centralized controls and freeing its people from arbitrary authority. Moreover, despite pretensions to a grand design, it is a state whose political, economic, and foreign policies have for more than 20 years reflected mainly improvisation and compromise.

Thanks largely to Tito's firm guiding hand, the Yugoslav experiment has so far been relatively successful. The economy, with massive aid from the West, has shed some of the more cumbersome bits of Marxist theory, weathered recurrent crises, and expanded at an impressive rate. The country has become increasingly industrialized and urbanized, and fewer than half of its people now work on the land. The material well-being of most of the population has been substantially improved. And despite threats and blandishments from opposing power blocs, Yugoslavia has retained its sovereignty and achieved an influence in world affairs far out of proportion to its size and power.

Nevertheless, Belgrade's separate road to socialism has been a rocky one. There has been a persistent conflict—one which was highlighted but not resolved by the ouster of Tito's conservative and ambitious heir apparent, Aleksandar Rankovic, in 1966—between those who favor greater political and economic liberalization and those who feel that the process of decentralization has already gone too far. The regime's failure to reduce the gap between the richer and poorer republics or to otherwise create a generally more egalitarian society has contributed to an undercurrent of discontent, particularly among students and workers. The interplay of governmental reforms, continuing economic problems, and a freer political climate has eroded the solidarity and authority of the Yugoslav Communist party (the League of Communists of Yugoslavia—LCY) and has led to a resurgence of bitter regional and ethnic animosities. Time and time again, Tito has had to bring his awesome personal prestige and authority to bear in order to prevent his innovative system from breaking down.

Against this background, Yugoslavia has moved deep into a difficult new transition period. Tito—who celebrated his 80th birthday in 1972—has been trying to prepare his country for the day when he will no longer be around to serve as the ultimate arbiter. Since September 1970 he has introduced a sweeping new series of political and economic reforms designed to anchor his system in constitutional law and formal institutions. Shaken by the serious challenge to federal authority which was raised by Croatian leaders in late 1971, he has reorganized the LCY and directed it to redefine its role within the political system. He has called on the army, as a truly national institution, to play an implicitly restraining role in domestic politics and to serve, if necessary, as the ultimate guarantor of federal integrity. And faced with a rapidly changing world scene, he has made repeated adjustments in his country's international course in hopes of fostering greater unity and prosperity at home and of preserving national security abroad.

But for all that Tito has done, the uncertainties which trouble his countrymen and cloud Yugoslavia's future remain. Tito's political reforms are as yet

incomplete and subject to periodic shifts in direction. In any event they will not be subjected to a true test of their viability until after his departure. Yugoslavia's economy, still moving away from bureaucratic controls and toward a radical decentralization of authority, faces an accumulation of problems. Extremist emigree groups have stepped up subversive and terrorist activities in hopes of exploiting the confusion of the succession period that is to come. And despite Moscow's currently friendly posture, the threat of Soviet meddling in Yugoslavia's internal affairs has not faded away.

There are, in fact, too many variables—some domestic, some international—which will bear on the country's course of development to permit confident prediction as to whether or not the postwar Yugoslav experiment will survive more or less intact after Tito leaves the scene. But Yugoslavia's strengths and weaknesses—geographic, sociological, political, and economic—can be cataloged. Its principal problems can be identified. And all these factors can be combined with an analysis of current trends and past performance to yield a rough presuccession balance sheet.



Land of Diversity (u/ou)

Yugoslavia is only about the size of Wyoming, but few countries in the world are as diversified in their physical, cultural, and economic makeup. It is frequently, if superficially, characterized as one country having two alphabets, three languages, four religions, five nationalities, and six republics. Its territory, as shown on the Summary Map, is irregular in shape, trending northwest to southeast along the eastern shores of the Adriatic Sea with maximum dimensions of about 550 miles in length and approximately 260 miles in width. Bounded by seven countries, Yugoslavia is a land of tiny villages and crowded cities, of superhighways and horse-drawn carts, and of symphony orchestras and blood feuds. It is a land where snow still clings to alpine peaks while summer vacationers crowd resorts along the 945 miles of its California-like coastline and on many of its more than 700 islands.

In the north, fertile lowlands stretch for some 300 miles along the Sava and Danube rivers, broken only by low hills. These are the Pannonian plains, so called because they occupy the site of the ancient Pannonian Sea which gradually drained away after the Danube carved the famous Iron Gate gorge and thereby opened an outlet to the Black Sea. Here the climate and terrain have favored extensive cultivation and the development of a dense transportation network which traces its beginnings to roads built by the Romans in the first century A.D. But most of Yugoslavia's territory is dominated by mountain ranges and peaks that make overland communication difficult and account for sharp variations in climate.

Elevations reach nearly 9,400 feet in the northwest, and throughout Yugoslavia's rugged highlands forest and scrub-covered ridges alternate with narrow steep-sided valleys and scattered level basins. The scenery is spectacular, but living is difficult. The karst zone, an area of limestone mountains and plateaus stretching the length of the Adriatic coast and extending about 100 miles inland, is particularly inhospitable. This dry, rough region is cut by meandering gorges, pockmarked by sinkholes and cracks, and undermined by extensive caverns. Because of limestone's porosity, a lack of water is a problem throughout the area—both on the mainland and on the adjacent coastal islands. Few of the rivers originating in the interior reach the Adriatic, and heavy rains disappear without a trace. Largely barren and unproductive, the harsh terrain of the karst zone still hampers efforts to overcome the isolation and backwardness of many of its inhabitants.

The natural corridors through Yugoslavia's mountain ranges provided by major river valleys have played an important role in the country's history. But these are few in number, and while there are some additional—and tortuous—routes which cross the western mountains over high passes, most of Yugoslavia's upland country remains relatively inaccessible. Development of this extensive region is further hindered by the fact that devastating earthquakes have caused considerable destruction there in the past and pose a constant threat to life and to costly engineering projects. Nevertheless, the highlands are economically important because of their resource base. Much of the country's mineral wealth is mined along the faults which crisscross the area. Heavy forests which cover the upper slopes of hills and mountains almost everywhere but in the dry western zone support a well-developed woodworking industry. And in the nonforested areas, meadow and alpine grasses provide pasturage for grazing.

For a country of its size, Yugoslavia possesses a relatively large and varied array of natural resources. It ranks among Europe's leading producers of antimony, chromium, bauxite, mercury, lead, and zinc. Iron and copper ores are also abundant, as are reserves of brown coal. Both oil and natural gas exist in exploitable quantities. The country's widely dispersed mineral resources also include substantial deposits of rock salt, calcium rock, and sulfur as well as smaller quantities of gold, silver, molybdenum, wolfram, cobalt, and uranium. Its forest resources are ample, and its hydroelectric power potential is considerable.

Yugoslavia's location, its difficult terrain, and the uneven distribution of its natural resources have all contributed to the diversity of its people. Little is known, however, of the original inhabitants of the area—principally Illyrians. They came under Greek influence in the fifth century B.C. and were incorporated into the Roman Empire some 500 years later. When Slavic tribes began pushing into the Balkans from beyond the Carpathians in the sixth and seventh centuries A.D., many Illyrians were killed or absorbed by the newcomers while others fled to the mountains and coastlands. The Albanians are believed to be descendents of the latter group. And there are still some Vlachs, descendents of Romanized Illyrians who never adopted the Slavonic language, living as nomadic herdsmen in the mountains of Macedonia. But ever since the middle of the eighth century, the

population of the lands comprising present-day Yugoslavia has been overwhelmingly Slavic in origin.

When the Slavs arrived in the Balkans, they encountered a frontier that was to play a critical role in their future development. It ran from the Danube and the Sava in the Pannonian plains down the Drina river and thence across a mountainous corner of what is now Montenegro to a point of the Adriatic coast not far from the current Albanian border. Emperor Theodosius, who drew this line in A.D. 395, thought that he was simply splitting the Roman Empire in half to stop his two sons from quarrelling. Yet for almost 1,600 years it has served as a cultural, religious, linguistic, and at times political boundary between the Latin Catholic west and the Greek Orthodox east.

Those South Slav groups that settled west of Theodosius' line—the Slovenes and the Croats—fell under the influence of the Holy Roman Empire and its successor, the Habsburg empire. They adopted the Latin alphabet, the Roman Catholic religion, and a Western political outlook. Those Slavs who settled east of the line—today's Serbs, Montenegrins, Bulgarians, and Macedonians—took their Orthodox version of Christianity, their Cyrillic alphabet, and their political traditions from Byzantium. Then, following the Turkish victory over the Serbs at the Battle of Kosovo in 1389, they had to endure five centuries of life under the Ottoman Empire—a disastrous experience which the Montenegrins (secure in their mountain redoubt), most Croats, and all Slovenes were spared. One legacy of this period of Turkish rule is the million-strong Yugoslav Muslim community in Bosnia and Hercegovina. Others include the general backwardness of much of southern Yugoslavia and the emergence of an Albanian ethnic majority in Serbia's hallowed Kosovo region.

Thus, despite the common ancestry shared by the majority of its population, history and geography have combined to give Yugoslavia the most complex ethnic composition of any country in Europe. There are five main Slav "nations"—Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians, and Montenegrins—and a number of substantial non-Slav minorities or "national groups," of which Albanians and the Hungarians are the largest. According to the last official survey—taken in 1953—a little over 12% of the people profess no religious belief, 42% are Serbian Orthodox, 32% are Roman Catholic, 12% are Muslim, and slightly less than 2% are Protestants. Different languages and different alphabets in which to write common languages continue to hinder communication and to excite national passions.[1] And despite the best efforts of the Tito regime, the inhabitants of Macedonia, Bosnia and Hercegovina, Montenegro, and Kosovo (now an autonomous province on the same level as Vojvodina) are still poor and backward in relation to the Croats and Slovenes.

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[1] Belgrade recently granted "equal status" to Hungarian and Albanian and now uses these as well as Yugoslavia's official languages—Serbo-Croatian, Slovenian, and Macedonian—in state and Communist party publications.

The Titoist System

For more than two decades, the Yugoslavs have been feeling their way toward the establishment of a truly federal decentralized socialist state, gradually discarding some of the more doctrinaire tenets of communism in favor of a freer, more open system. The social order Belgrade has been building—labeled "self-management"—is incredibly complex. Many of its features, including those still in the planning stage, have no parallel or precedent in political or economic practice anywhere else in the world. The Yugoslavs themselves do not seem to have any clear idea of where they are heading, and, in any event, the room for confusion and error is great. (U OU)

Political features (S)

Yugoslavia's Constitution—the third formulated by the Tito regime since coming to power—was promulgated in 1963 and changed the name of the country to the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Subsequently modified by some 40 amendments, it provides for the separation of the executive, legislative, and judicial functions of government and designates the five-chamber legislature—the Federal Assembly—as the supreme organ of political power and self-management. (The true locus of power, the LCY, is described simply as the country's leading force, ideological guide, and initiator of political activity.) Theoretically subordinate to the Federal Assembly, the Presidency and Federal Executive Council (cabinet) are accorded relatively broad executive powers within the bounds of federal competence.

Decentralization is the key feature of the Yugoslav political system. Under the program embodied in the 23 constitutional amendments adopted in mid-1971,

the country is moving toward a loose federation of nearly autonomous republics. The authority of the central government has been restricted mainly to conducting foreign policy, providing for national defense, regulating and maintaining a "unified national market," channeling funds from the richer to the poorer areas, and arbitrating regional disputes. All other functions and responsibilities—together with control of the bulk of the nation's material resources—have been or are soon to be surrendered to the republics and provinces. The process of decentralization is to go much further than this, however. Tito's blueprint calls for the exercise of considerable autonomy—backed by adequate independent financial resources—at the lowest level of local government, the commune. A new set of constitutional amendments giving effect to this principle is scheduled to be introduced in 1973. Plans are also afoot for completely revamping the legislative system.

Increased efficiency is not the only objective of these projected changes. Tito must reckon with the fact that while organized pluralism—the participation of regional organs, federal bodies, and various interest groups (youth, labor, professional, and economic) in the process of government—has become an indispensible element in the self-management ethic, it has combined with the gradual liberalization of the Yugoslav political climate to release centrifugal forces which could paralyze the country's federal system. Hence he hopes that the proliferation and realignment of decisionmaking centers will complement the other steps he has taken to contain these forces, to dilute the power of the republics, and to blur current regional and national disputes.

Indeed, determined to avoid a crisis of succession, Tito has undertaken a radical overhaul of his country's entire political structure. He has created collective executive bodies in both the party and government (the LCY's eight-man Executive Bureau and the 23-man Presidency) as heirs to his enormous personal power. He has staffed these bodies (in which genuine debate and give-and-take have become a standard part of the decisionmaking process) with outstanding republican leaders in hopes that by bringing the "barons" to Belgrade—and by bolstering the power of the collective presidency in relation to Yugoslavia's Federal Assembly—he will mute the interrepublic squabbling which reached such alarming proportions in 1971. In addition, he has streamlined the Federal Executive Council and established a number of interrepublic coordinating commissions charged with resolving disputes before they reach a point where they must be referred to the collective Presidency for decision.

To supplement these moves, Tito has sought enactment of an array of additional statutory safeguards designed both to restrain personal ambitions and to contain regional rivalries. The key elements in this program include rotation of all major party and government assignments at 2- to 3-year intervals, equal representation for the republics in certain important bodies, and an almost check-and-balance division of authority both within and outside the governmental structure. The trouble with all this is that the system which Tito is creating is so complicated and cumbersome that it could easily break down. In fact, were it not for the sobering shock of the dramatic resurgence of Croatian chauvinism in late 1971, it might not be functioning as well as it is right down.

Market socialism (C)

The rudiments of Yugoslavia's current economic system were established in the years immediately following the country's expulsion from the Soviet bloc. During the period from 1950 to 1955, the means of production were transferred from state to "social" ownership, workers' management councils were established in all enterprises, agricultural collectivization was abandoned, the economic ministries and the state monopoly over foreign trade were abolished, state financing of investments was reduced, and obligatory state plans were replaced by far less detailed "indicative planning." Since then, a series of major reforms—in 1961, 1965, 1967, and 1971—have moved the economy ever closer to what has been termed, for lack of precedent, market socialism.

As in the political field, decentralization has been the key element in Belgrade's approach to the management of the economy. By giving local administrations, individual firms, and—through workers councils—the workers themselves greater authority over their own affairs, and by providing them with a growing opportunity to reap the rewards of their own enterprise, the regime hopes to promote efficiency, modernization, and long-term growth. It also hopes to make Yugoslav products competitive in world markets. Thus, while federal authorities are still charged with maintaining and regulating an integrated national market and with channeling money to the country's poorer regions, their direct role in the economy has been considerably reduced.

Decisions on incomes, output, investment, and foreign trade are now left largely in the hands of banks and enterprises. Federal funds—and taxation

powers—have been sharply curtailed. The republics have taken over the federal extrabudgetary accounts, including a number of major investment projects, and have acquired a substantial role in the formulation and execution of national economic policy. Steps have been taken to provide for the protection and gradual expansion of the private sector of the economy and to attract foreign investment. All told, these changes have created a much freer system, one which is oriented toward Western markets and technology, and one which has proved difficult to control.

Belgrade has consistently tried to rely primarily on indirect monetary-credit policy to influence prices, imports, investment, and consumption. But the decentralized Yugoslav economic system, operating largely under market forces, has tended to favor the northern republics over the less developed southern regions, to generate severe balance of payments difficulties, and to accentuate cyclical fluctuations. These problems have resulted in a very uneven pattern of growth, both nationally and regionally.[2] In the face of recurrent bouts with inflation, high levels of unemployment, liquidity crises, and growing disparities between the richer and poorer republics, the regime has been forced to intervene in the operations of the economy—through price freezes, import controls, and other "emergency" measures—more directly and more often than it hoped would be the case. And despite the Western bias inherent in Yugoslavia's program of economic reform, persistent trade imbalances with hard currency partners have spurred efforts to expand complementary economic bridges to the East

Nonalignment (S)

This renewed interest in Soviet bloc trade and credits is illustrative of the delicate balancing act between East and West which Belgrade has managed to sustain for more than 20 years. It has not been easy. The Yugoslavs have been determined to maintain their independence and freedom of action, to stand as a model socialist state in the eyes of the world, and to play an important role in regional and global affairs. Thus, while their policy of nonalignment (or, as Belgrade often calls it, "active peaceful coexistence") requires strict avoidance of moves which could be construed as linking them with either NATO or the Warsaw Pact, it has never meant the sort of passive neutrality practiced by the Swiss. It has, in fact, proved to be a remarkably flexible doctrine, responsive not only to fluctuations in the status of Belgrade's relations with its most worrisome potential adversary, the Soviet Union, but to a wide range of broader developments as well.

In the early 1950's, when the threat of Soviet invasion seemed very real, Belgrade saw nothing inconsistent with its newly adopted posture of nonalignment in accepting massive loans and grants from the West, in equipping its armed forces with American material, or in signing tripartite agreements with Greece and Turkey covering both economic and military cooperation. But tensions in the Balkans began to ease with Stalin's death, and, even before Khrushchev made his famous trip of atonement to Belgrade in May of 1955, the Yugoslavs had started to cast their policy in a less parochial mold and to make common cause with nonaligned regimes in Africa and Asia. Since then, Tito has come to enjoy the reputation of being one of the world's most traveled and most distinguished elder statesmen. And although self-serving, Belgrade's emphasis on a number of elevated principles of international conduct—the obligations of

[2] Although Yugoslavia's gross national product (GNP) has grown at an average rate of about 5.5% since 1950, the tendency of the regime to set overambitious targets has contributed to a boom and bust pattern. In mid-1972, Yugoslavia still possessed one of the least developed economies in Europe. Its per capita GNP was estimated at about US$1,000—almost as high as in Greece and Romania, but considerably below the levels achieved elsewhere in either the western or eastern sectors of the continent. Differences in level of economic development among the country's six republics and two autonomous provinces were much more pronounced than they had been in 1945. In the immediate postwar period, Slovenia, the richest republic, enjoyed a per capita GNP a little more than three times larger than that of Kosovo, the most backward region. In 1972, the Slovenes were nearly six times richer than their countrymen in Kosovo, with a per capita GNP of almost $1,700—about equal to that of Austria.

rich countries toward the poor, the sovereignty and equality of all states, the right of each state to conduct its own affairs without interference from abroad, and the inadmissability of the use of force in interstate relations—has won Yugoslavia both widespread respect and a disproportionately influential voice in international forums.

The Yugoslavs are probably no more prone than other peoples to act out of lofty principle when issues get close to home and affect important national interests; nevertheless, their behavior has generally been consistent with the professed objectives of nonalignment. Their independent assessment of various international developments has often led them to adopt positions close to those of Moscow—and there have been periods when Soviet-Yugoslav relations have been relatively warm. Sometimes, indeed, the Yugoslavs have seemed all too ready to give the Kremlin the benefit of the doubt. But Belgrade has not hesitated to stand in open opposition to Soviet efforts to consolidate their hegemony in Eastern Europe or to expand their influence in the Mediterranean area. Tito's outspoken criticism of Moscow's behavior, coupled with his refusal to abandon his heretical domestic course, resulted in major Soviet economic sanctions in 1958 and in threats of even more dire punishment some 10 years later. Similarly, Yugoslavia's actions in support of various national liberation movements, its condemnation of all alleged manifestations of imperialism and neocolonialism, and its critical appraisal of "reactionary" developments in the West have at one time or another sorely tried the patience of most of its important trading partners and creditors in NATO.

Tito has sought to reduce the risks involved in his assertive foreign policy posture by stressing his country's dedication to the concept of peaceful coexistence and its consequent desire to avoid letting occasional quarrels with Communist or non-Communist states seriously disrupt established diplomatic and economic ties. (Yugoslavia's action in breaking off relations with Israel in the wake of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war was a notable exception in the latter regard.) But Belgrade's parallel efforts to bolster Yugoslavia's precarious position by developing and dominating a worldwide movement of nonaligned nations have fallen short of their mark.

In terms of prestige, of course, the rewards of Yugoslavia's diplomatic offensive in the Third World have been enormous. And there have been other, more tangible gains as well. For example, the first nonaligned summit—held in Belgrade in September 1961—inspired the subsequent formation of a broad, economically oriented grouping of underdeveloped countries (both aligned and nonaligned), the so-called "77." This group, now numerically stronger than its name indicates, was the prime mover in the formation of the United Nations Conference for Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and continues to yield Yugoslavia some economic and political benefits.

But the hoped-for vast markets for Yugoslav goods in the Third World have failed to materialize. Moreover, when the nonaligned chiefs of state gathered in Cairo in 1964 for their second meeting, they were already badly divided by local issues and the impact of the sharpening Sino-Soviet dispute. Since then, the nonaligned movement has grown in numbers, but not in cohesion. Most of its founding members have died or been deposed.[3] In recent years, Yugoslavia's principal nonaligned partners, Egypt and India, have become more dependent on Soviet support than Belgrade would like. Not only did New Delhi and Cairo fail to join Yugoslavia in condemning the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia (and the so-called Brezhnev Doctrine) but the Indian and Egyptian regimes subsequently violated Belgrade's perception of nonalignment by concluding treaties of friendship and cooperation with Moscow.

Disillusioned, the Yugoslavs have begun to focus their foreign policy effort on matters closer to home—on the rapidly changing political and economic scene in Europe and on the strategically important Mediterranean area—and on fostering their promising new rapprochement with Peking. While it has not retreated from its established position of censure with respect to the invasion of Czechoslovakia, Belgrade has welcomed and encouraged a thaw in its relations with the Soviets and their Warsaw Pact allies. Taking advantage of the general relaxation of tensions in Europe, the Yugoslavs have redoubled their efforts to find ways of circumventing discriminatory trade arrangements in both East and West. At the same time, they have lost no opportunity to remind both Washington and Moscow of the necessity of taking the views of small nations into account in any moves aimed at reshaping the existing political, military, and economic situation in

[3] By mid-1967, the fall of such Third World leaders as Sukarno and Nkrumah, coupled with a deterioration in Yugoslav relations with Italy, the coup in Greece, and—most of all—the Arab-Israeli war, had led Tito to postulate the existence of an American-led conspiracy against all "progressive" states. This particular paranoia—probably never entirely shared by Tito's lieutenants—abruptly disappeared when the invasion of Czechoslovakia focused Belgrade's attention on a far more tangible and urgent threat to Yugoslav security.

Europe. Thus they have emphasized their continued support of efforts aimed at an early convocation of a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) within a broad nonbloc framework, and they have also shown active interest in proposals for organizing an equally extrabloc conference of Mediterranean countries.

The shift in Belgrade's policy has been one of emphasis, not substance. Yugoslavia remains an active and influential member of the still largely Afro-Asian nonaligned grouping. But its muted performance at the most recent nonaligned gatherings—the 1971 Lusaka summit meeting and the 1972 conference of foreign ministers in Guyana—stands in sharp contrast to the vigorous leadership it exerted in earlier years.

All-people's defense (S)

Belgrade has traditionally sought to give the impression that an invading force, no matter how strong or from what quarter, would meet with fierce resistance and, even if initially successful, would encounter prolonged and costly partisan warfare. In keeping with this strategy, and with an eye to bringing the conduct of military affairs into closer harmony with the concept of decentralization, Belgrade began to consider plans for the development of sizable territorial forces and for increased emphasis on guerrilla warfare in 1967. Originally drafted on the assumption that Yugoslavia's defenses should be directed primarily against a possible attack from the West, these plans were hastily reoriented following the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968. By November of that year, they had been incorporated into a draft bill for consideration by the Federal Assembly, and on 11 February 1969 Yugoslavia's new Nationwide (or "all-people's") Defense Law was officially adopted.

Under the new law, Yugoslavia has established a two-tiered defense system composed of its regular armed forces (presently totaling about 229,000 men and collectively designated as the Yugoslav National Army—JNA) and territorial defense units. Only the latter force (now said to consist of more than 1 million armed citizens) and the larger complementary civil defense organization are decentralized, with republican, local, and factory authorities given primary responsibility for the levy, training, funding, and activation of the component units. Regional planning, supervision, and coordination fall to the republics, but overall strategy and control remain in the hands of the Presidency and designated military organs in Belgrade.

Yugoslavia's defensive posture is now more clearly and openly based than ever before on the practical and deterrent aspects of the concept of a "nation in arms." Almost everyone between the ages of 16 and 65 is required to undergo training in military tactics, first aid, use of weapons, and the strategy of collective defense. Of these, men from 17 to 60 and women from 19 to 50 may be assigned to armed units. If attack comes, plans call for a temporary forward defense by the centrally controlled and more heavily armed regular forces (assisted, where possible, by the activities of local territorial units), followed by the orderly and fighting retreat of these forces into the mountains. Theoretically, the time gained would suffice to transport enough government personnel and records into mountain redoubts to mobilize many of the country's more than 2 million reservists and to activate additional territorial partisan units. And once settled in the mountains, the retreating regular forces would cooperate with partisan units in continued operations against the invader.

Implementation of the new defense law has not been without its problems, but Belgrade has demonstrated its determination to strengthen the effectiveness of the nationwide system. It has donated a considerable quantity of military equipment, mostly light arms, to the program. It has rearranged its military districts in order to facilitate cooperation between local JNA commanders and their counterparts in the territorial forces. It has tested the system in a number of military exercises, including one, in the fall of 1971, larger than any staged on Yugoslav territory since the height of the Stalinist threat in the early 1950's. In addition, language was included in the 1971 constitutional amendments which declares that no one has the right to sign or recognize the surrender, or occupation, of all or any part of Yugoslavia or to prevent Yugoslav citizens from taking up arms against an invader. Such acts would be punishable as treason.

Lingering Problems

Tito has labored hard to insure that a fully sovereign, nonaligned, and self-managing Yugoslavia will survive his passing. But serious problems—including ethnic and regional rivalries, economic instability, and foreign meddling—still plague the country and will continue to do so for years to come. Since many of these problems are closely interrelated, their resolution is likely to prove more difficult. Yugoslavia's economic difficulties, for example, both contribute to and are compounded by its complex nationalities problem. (U/OU)

The nationalities (C)

No nation in Europe is more burdened with deep-rooted ethnic hatreds than is Yugoslavia. Historically, political assassination and civil war have suggested that no regime in Belgrade can long maintain effective national unity solely through authoritarian means. But current efforts to solve the country's problems through decentralization of authority and the creation of a relatively open society are by no means assured of success either.

Tito's leadership and the sheer force of his personality and prestige kept the problem of ethnic animosities at bay throughout most of the postwar period. In recent years, however, envy and distrust born of the growing disparities in regional levels of economic development have reinforced old feuds and suspicions and, in the freer political climate which has accompanied Tito's reforms, have resulted in a marked resurgence of regional and ethnic self-assertiveness. In trying to cope with this phenomenon, party and government leaders have sometimes gotten swept up in it, becoming partisans on one side or the other. The situation reached crisis proportions in late 1971 when central party and government organs proved incapable of reining in the nationalist-infested Croatian leadership. Tito had to intervene personally to set things straight. Before the dust settled, more than 600 Croats had lost their jobs and the most outspoken nationalists among them had been remanded for trial.

With the Croats at least temporarily in hand, Tito has moved against regional chauvinists throughout Yugoslavia. Even so, the situation remains potentially explosive. As in the past, the three most volatile elements are the traditional animosity between Serb and Croat, the struggle of the Albanians in Kosovo to free themselves of Serb domination, and the conflicting interests of the poorer and richer regions. None of these problems is likely to be soon resolved. The government now admits that its program of channeling investment funds to backward areas will require a considerable gestation period before it produces results. The Serbs will continue to chafe at the erosion of their traditional status and prerogatives entailed in the ongoing process of decentralization. They are likely to be particularly reluctant to grant further autonomy to Kosovo—or even to live up to the spirit of current constitutional provisions pertaining to the status and rights of that province. As a result, the Albanians will probably continue to regard themselves as a repressed minority and may again (as they did in 1968) resort to large-scale disorders. For their part, the Croats—still smarting from the purge imposed upon them by Belgrade—are likely to remain especially sensitive to any real or imagined injury to their political or economic interests for a long time to come.

The party and the army (S)

Tito's plans for pressing forward with political and economic decentralization called for the burden of maintaining national unity to fall squarely on the shoulders of the federal organs of the LCY. And it was here that his system broke down in 1971. In the charged atmosphere of frank and open political discussion which surrounded the preparations for Yugoslavia's latest round of reforms, regional nationalism flared and split the ranks of the party. In keeping with the spirit of the times, the LCY became something approaching a federation of nine relatively autonomous party organizations: six republican plus—on a slightly lower plane—two provincial and the military. By late 1971, the Croatian party had virtually ceased to communicate with the central LCY organs in Belgrade.

Beginning with the stern measures he employed against the errant Croats, Tito has moved to dispel all thoughts of a federalized party and to restore rigid party discipline. Among other developments, the Executive Bureau has announced that henceforth it will send out "teams" to monitor the activities of local republican, provincial, and military party units. But the LCY remains in disarray. Confusion has been heightened by Tito's highhanded circumvention of the system he himself had built, as well as by his failure to set forth any clear-cut directives regarding the party's future role. In addition, Tito's tough tactics have revived the old controversy between party liberals and conservatives, and many liberal

leaders—including Serbia's competent former party chief Marko Nikezic—have expressed grave reservations about the current drive to recentralize the LCY.

Tito's patience with his liberal critics apparently ran out in October 1972. Late that month, Nikezic and his second in command within the Serbian party, Latinka Perovic, were forced to resign. Within 30 days the President of the Assembly, Belgrade's party boss, the premier of Slovenia, Yugoslavia's Foreign Minister, the secretary of the Macedonian party, and three prominent editors followed him into retirement. Further purges seem inevitable. It seems likely that Tito's views will ultimately prevail, but the LCY could well emerge from its current troubles as a thoroughly demoralized and relatively ineffective organization. If so, the army may temporarily hold the key to Yugoslavia's future.

The JNA remains a highly centralized organization—the only true national institution left in Yugoslavia. Like the party, it has been a mainstay of the regime. But, unlike the party, it long remained outside the mainstream of developments in Yugoslav society. In recent years, however, Belgrade has sought to revamp the traditionally aloof military establishment and to encourage it to take a more active interest in domestic affairs. To these ends, changes were made which rid the JNA of its most conservative officers, restructured and rejuvenated its party organization, and gave it broader representation in policymaking councils. All this has been reflected in a marked change in the general attitude prevailing in top military circles. A new interest in the resolution of political, social, and economic problems affecting the country's unity (and thus bearing on military capabilities) has emerged. And, although the military establishment's general loyalty to Tito has never been seriously questioned, ranking military officials now stress that this loyalty extends to Tito's system as well.

At the height of the Croatian crisis, Tito sought and received unreserved military backing for his move against the nationalist leadership in Zagreb. Since then he has emphasized his desire that the military establishment continue to exert a restraining influence on fractious local party and government leaders. But while amply justified under Yugoslavia's current circumstances, this open invitation to the military to take a greater hand in civilian affairs carries certain risks of its own. It dramatizes Yugoslavia's domestic problems, adding to the general malaise at home and encouraging efforts to meddle from abroad. Moreover, despite Belgrade's efforts to achieve a better ethnic balance within the JNA and to give the military establishment a more progressive cast, Serbs and Montenegrins are still strongly over-represented at the NCO and company officer level and a number of top military leaders still tend toward a conservative position on the scope and pace of Yugoslavia's reforms. Hence the prospect of a more active military role in domestic politics could increase tensions in the northern republics. Furthermore, while none of Yugoslavia's present military leaders seem to entertain political ambitions, there is always a chance that their taste for power could grow with experience.

The economy (C)

Yugoslav economic performance in the first half of 1972 was considerably better than in 1971. Improvement was most marked in the field of foreign trade where Belgrade's success in restricting imports and, thanks to two devaluations of the dinar in 1971, in stimulating exports raised hopes—albeit perhaps prematurely—that the country might register a modest current account surplus for the first time in 7 years. (In 1971, it ended up with a US$324 million deficit.) But despite encouraging statistics and the welcome boost provided by some $500 million in new economic assistance from the West and by two large investment credits (one for $130 million, the other for $1.3 billion) obtained from the Soviet Union, the Yugoslav economy remains deeply troubled.

Although more than 750,000 workers have left the country to seek jobs abroad, domestic unemployment still stands at record levels. Import controls are now beginning to affect raw material supplies, thereby contributing to a general slowing of industrial growth and threatening efforts to create new jobs and to expand exports. In an atmosphere still marked by sharp regional rivalries, the government's attempts to stabilize the inflation-ridden domestic economy have been severely hampered by the further decentralization of authority embodied in the 1971 reforms. Despite an extended freeze, consumer prices were rising at more than double the planned rate as 1972 drew to a close. The cost of living, fueled in part by a midyear 16% increase in food prices, was continuing to rise sharply. And Belgrade's efforts to control the money supply and personal incomes were still being opposed by the republics and the trade unions.

At the same time, implementation of some of the recent economic reforms has been delayed by a lack of consensus on basic goals and by foot-dragging at the republic level. Creation of a domestic foreign exchange market, for example, which had been slated for mid-1972, was postponed for at least 6 months.

Similarly, steps to restrict investments by unprofitable firms have had little effect.

Problems such as these promise to plague Yugoslavia for a long time to come. Neither the government's controversial stabilization program nor the most recent round of decentralizing reforms attack the basic causes of Yugoslavia's economic instability. Even if Belgrade succeeds in muting regional rivalries, its complex and cumbersome economic system will be difficult to control. Unless the Yugoslavs can restructure production to increase output of goods exportable to the West, their balance of payments will again be severely strained when heavy loan repayments are resumed in the mid-1970's. And unless Belgrade opts permanently for an industrial growth rate considerably lower than its current 9% to 10% target, one modest enough to keep both inflation and imports in check, the boom and bust pattern of the 1960's is likely to be repeated throughout the 1970's.

External influences (C)

In any event, Yugoslavia's economic—and perhaps political—fortunes will continue to depend to some degree on external factors over which Belgrade can exercise but limited control. As in the past, Belgrade's membership in the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund and its active participation in various programs administered by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development are likely to yield both financial and technical assistance. But the situation with regard to Yugoslavia's principal foreign trade partners is more problematical.[4] The Yugoslavs have long been worried about the hardening East-West economic division of Europe. In order to protect themselves, they obtained observer status in the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA) in 1964, became a full member of GATT in 1967, and negotiated a 3-year trade agreement with the Common Market in 1970. However, the recent expansion of the Common Market has raised new questions as to whether the Yugoslavs will be able to maintain a high level of exports to the West, and thus accounts in part for Belgrade's interest in increasing trade and economic cooperation with the Soviet Union and the other members of CEMA.

[4] In 1971, Yugoslavia's leading trade partners were West Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union in that order. About 35% of Yugoslavia's trade was conducted with Common Market countries versus approximately 28% with CEMA countries, representing a slight shift in favor of CEMA in comparison with the previous year. About 6% of Yugoslav trade was with the United States. All told, the industrialized West accounted for a little over 60% of Yugoslav trade, and another 11% was with developing countries.

Although most welcome, Moscow's generous response to Yugoslav requests for credit draws attention to another problem that is likely to plague Belgrade throughout the succession period: foreign intervention in Yugoslavia's internal affairs. The Soviets will not be the only culprits, and the threat from the Kremlin is not an immediate one. But even though Moscow has learned to live with—and even grudgingly accept—the Titoist heresy, the Soviets have clearly not abandoned hopes of someday guiding the Yugoslavs back onto a more orthodox path. Thus the Kremlin has used the recent improvement in its relations with Belgrade to maneuver for a position of influence in post-Tito Yugoslavia. In return for their latest investment credits, the Soviets obtained direct access to local enterprises, thereby joining the West in being allowed to bypass federal authorities and to bargain directly with individual firms.

The risk of such an arrangement to Yugoslav political independence is negligible in the near term. At present, some 70% of Belgrade's trade is with the non-Communist world. Moreover, in recent years the Yugoslavs have sought and received more than US$2.5 billion in credits from the West. Over the long run, however, the Soviets are likely to gain both valuable local contacts and an added increment of economic leverage stemming from the importance of their assistance to Belgrade's program for promoting the development of Yugoslavia's poorer regions.

Dissident elements and emigree groups (S)

Yugoslavia's bitter nationality rivalries, together with the growing community of Yugoslavs who are temporarily working abroad, provide rich opportunities for less subtle forms of foreign intervention. The seriousness of this threat is difficult to gage. But hostile elements—including former political prisoners (primarily the so-called Cominformists of the Stalin era), purged party apparatchiks, and, most important, ethnic and regional chauvinists—do exist in Yugoslavia. Their exact numbers are unknown, but some have links with extremist emigree groups and others may have ties with less visible foreign sponsors. This program is particularly troublesome with respect to the uneasy situation in Croatia, for there are more than a dozen Croatian nationalist emigree organizations—spiritual heirs of Ante Pavelic's *Ustashi* movement—scattered about the globe and enjoying ready access to Yugoslav tourists and expatriate workers.

Belgrade quite naturally fears that after Tito's departure some foreign power—particularly the U.S.S.R.—will seek to exploit Croatian discontent in

order to increase its own influence in Yugoslavia. In fact, certain Ustashi spokesmen have claimed that the Soviets have already offered them various forms of encouragement, and one Yugoslav party leader has charged that "powerful intelligence services" (presumably he meant Western services) are backing both *Ustashi* and "Fascist" organizations within Yugoslavia itself. But so far, at least there is insufficient evidence to support either set of claims.

Be that as it may, the various Ustashi organizations seem to have developed ample sources of funds within the Yugoslav emigree community. Encouraged by Yugoslavia's recent nationality problems, they have intensified their campaign for an independent Croatia—combining propaganda broadsides with guerrilla raids, air piracy, and other acts of violence. The general upsurge of terrorism which began with the murder of the Yugoslav ambassador to Sweden in 1971 led Belgrade to seek the assistance of Austria, Australia, West Germany, France, Sweden, Canada, and the United States in controlling extremist Yugoslav emigree organizations and in monitoring the activities of the larger groups of Yugoslav workers located within their borders. So far, however, these requests have yielded meager results. More emigree terrorism undoubtedly lies ahead, and the problem may well become worse after Tito leaves the scene.

How Viable? (s)

The problems confronting the Yugoslavs are formidable, and the time remaining before they will be deprived of the stabilizing influence of Tito's firm leadership and enormous personal prestige is limited at best. But all is not a litany of woe. The Yugoslavs have both the human and material resources for viable and prosperous statehood. They are a tough and resiliant people, and for all its weaknesses, their self-managing society is far more vibrant and dynamic than that of any of their Balkan neighbors.

Yugoslavia has, in fact, achieved a certain strength through adversity. Its people are still divided, but there is a genuine pride in the nation's postwar accomplishments in the face of great difficulties. The Czechoslovak crisis, the subsequent pressures brought to bear on both Yugoslavia and Romania by the Soviet Union, and the shock of the recent troubles with Croatian nationalists have combined to reinforce an underlying consensus that everyone has much to lose—and more now than ever before—should the Titoist system be swept away. A clearer picture of the succession period and its probable mechanics has emerged from the chaos of the winter of 1971-72, together with a renewed determination to make these arrangements work. Even those leaders who have been forced to resign in recent months have for the most part accepted their fate gracefully rather than risk further aggravating the situation.

Thus while the succession period is unlikely to be as smooth as Tito would like, the true test of the system he has created may not come until several years after his death. With the passage of time, persistent regional tensions, economic troubles, foreign meddling, and the endless struggle between party liberals and conservatives could well dispel any initial—and much needed—atmosphere of cooperation and compromise. If there were then no clear external threat to exercise a sobering and unifying influence, a serious political crisis could ensue. In such an event, the consequences for Yugoslavia and its innovative system would depend on factors which cannot now be fully foreseen.



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Chronology (u/ou)

1102

Croatia accepts a Hungarian king, losing its independence.

1331-55

Tsar Stephen Dusan rules over a Serbian empire—the golden age of medieval Serbia.

1389

Turks defeat the Serbs at the battle of Kosovo to begin nearly 500 years of Turkish domination.

1527

Croatia passes under Habsburg sovereignty.

1718

The Turks withdraw from Croatia.

1804-13

Karadjordje leads the first Serbian rebellion against the Turks.

1815

Second Serbian rebellion, led by Milos Obrenovic, gains concessions from the Turks.

1830

Serbia is granted autonomy by Turkey.

1867

Last Turkish soldiers leave Serbia.

1878

Treaty of Berlin makes Serbia independent.

1882

Serbia is proclaimed a kingdom.

1885

Serbia is defeated in war against Bulgaria.

1912

The First Balkan War—Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece, and Montenegro defeat the Turks and expel them from Macedonia and Albania.

1913

The Second Balkan War—Serbia, Greece, Montenegro, Romania, and Turkey defeat Bulgaria.

1914

Archduke Francis Ferdinand is assassinated at Sarajevo, resulting in Austrian declaration of war on Serbia and the start of World War I.

1918

Yugoslavia is created as the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.

1941
April

German and Italian forces overrun Yugoslavia.

1943
November

Second session of Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation declares itself the "supreme legislative and executive body of Yugoslavia."

1946
January

New constitution creates the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia.

1948
June

Cominform publishes resolution condemning and expelling the Yugoslav Communist Party.

1949
September

U.S.S.R. denounces 1945 treaty of friendship, mutual assistance, and postwar cooperation with Yugoslavia.

1951
November

United States and Yugoslavia agree on military assistance within framework of Mutual Defense Assistance Pact.

1953
March

Regime abandons efforts to collectivize agriculture.

1954
January

Third (Extraordinary) plenum of Party Central Committee removes Milovan Djilas from the Central Committee.

October

Dispute between Yugoslavia and Italy over Free Territory of Trieste ends with signing of Memorandum of Understanding by Yugoslavia, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

1955
May

Khrushchev, Bulganin, and Mikoyan visit Belgrade and seek reconciliation with Tito.

1956
June

Tito visits the U.S.S.R.; party ties are reestablished.

September-October

Khrushchev and Tito confer on Yugoslav-Soviet frictions.

November

Tito attacks Stalinist elements and Soviet role in Hungarian revolt.

1957
August

Tito and Khrushchev meet secretly in Bucharest.

October

Yugoslavia recognizes East German regime; West Germany breaks diplomatic ties with Yugoslavia.

November

Yugoslav representatives refuse to sign 12-party Moscow declaration.

1958
April

Seventh Party Congress meets and adopts new party program conflicting with Soviet doctrine.

May

Pravda editorial asserts that the program of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia is revisionist and contrary to Marxism-Leninism.

1960
February

Cardinal Aloysius Stepinac, outspoken foe of Tito's Communist regime, dies and way is paved for improved relations between the regime and the Roman Catholic Church.

1961
September

First conference of nonaligned states in Belgrade.

1962
December

Tito pays unofficial visit to the U.S.S.R.; hears Khrushchev declare that Yugoslavia is a socialist country.

1963
April

Yugoslavia adopts new constitution.

October

Tito visits the United States.

1964
September

Tito meets on separate occasions with Communist leaders of Romania, Hungary, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia.

October

Tito attends second nonaligned conference in Cairo.

December

Eighth Party Congress meets and reaffirms Yugoslavia's domestic and foreign policies.

1965
April

Tito visits Algeria and the U.A.R.

June

Tito visits Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and the Soviet Union.

September

Tito visits Bulgaria.

1966
June

Diplomatic relations are restored with the Vatican.

July

Tito ousts Vice President and Party Secretary Rankovic from his party and government posts, accusing him of engaging in a "struggle for power."

October

Fifth Plenum of the Central Committee starts the reform of the party by reorganizing its leading bodies. Rankovic is expelled from the LCY.

December

New Basic Law on Internal Affairs curtails the power of the secret police.

1967
April

National elections are held; constitutional amendments alter the structure of the Federal Assembly and the executive, giving the republics more authority.

June

Tito attends Soviet bloc meeting in Moscow in the wake of the Israeli defeat of the Arabs.

July

Federal Assembly adopts legislation allowing foreign investment in Yugoslavia.

August

Tito visits the U.A.R., Syria, and Iraq to sound out possibilities for a Middle East settlement.

1968
January

Diplomatic relations are restored with West Germany.

January-February

Tito visits Afghanistan, Pakistan, Cambodia, India, Southern Yemen, Ethiopia, and the U.A.R.; calls for a Third World nonaligned conference.

April

Tito visits Japan, Mongolia, Iran, and the U.S.S.R.

June

Students riot in Belgrade.

1968
July

The Yugoslav economy is further decentralized.

August

Tito visits Czechoslovakia and endorses the Dubcek regime; later denounces the invasion of Czechoslovakia and orders partial mobilization of the Yugoslav army.

December

Constitution is amended to give more power to the republics and reorganize the Federal Assembly.
Legislation is introduced in the Federal Assembly calling for the creation of the "all-people's defense" system.

1969
March

Ninth LCY Congress adopts new, liberal statutes and reorganizes party.

April-May

Elections are held under new electoral law, which provides for elections every 4 years involving all assembly seats.

September

Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko visits Yugoslavia in an effort to patch up relations which have been poor since the Warsaw Pact intervention in Czechoslovakia.

1970
April

Ranking party leader Bakaric leads Yugoslav delegation to the Lenin centennial in Moscow.

August

Yugoslavia and the Vatican raise diplomatic relations to the ambassadorial level.

September

Tito leads Yugoslav delegation to third nonaligned summit in Lusaka, Zambia.
Tito announces his intention to create a collective presidency and revive the position of vice president.

September-October

President Nixon visits Yugoslavia.

1971
February

Tito pays his first visit to Nasir's successor, Egyptian President Sadat.

April

The Yugoslav Ambassador to Sweden is murdered by *Ustashi* terrorists.

May

Second Congress of Self-Managers meets in Sarajevo.

July

New government is formed in Yugoslavia; Krste Crvenkovski, a Macedonian, is chosen to rotating post of Vice President.

September

Soviet party boss Brezhnev visits Yugoslavia.

December

Tito purges nationalists from Croatian party ranks.

1972
January

Ustashi terrorists bomb a Stockholm-to-Belgrade Yugoslav airliner.

March

Soviet Defense Minister Grechko visits Yugoslavia.

June

Tito visits the Soviet Union.

July

19 *Ustashi* terrorists lead unsuccessful armed attack in Bosnia and Hercegovina.

August

Rato Dugonjic, a Serb from Bosnia and Hercegovina, replaces Crvenkovski as Vice President.

October

Tito purges Serbian party leadership.

Area Brief

LAND (U/OU)

Size: 98,700 sq. mi.

Use: 32% arable, 25% meadows and pastures, 34% forested, 9% urban, waste, and other

Land boundaries: 1,863 mi.

PEOPLE (U/OU)

Population: 20,841,000 (1 January 1973 estimate by U.S. Bureau of the Census), 20,504,516 (31 March 1971 census)

Ethnic divisions: 43% Serb, 23% Croat, 8% Slovene, 6% Macedonian, 3% Montenegrin, 5% Albanian, 3% Hungarian, 9% other (1971 census)

Religion: 42% Serbian Orthodox, 32% Roman Catholic, 12% Muslim, 2% Protestant, 12% other or none (1953 census)

Language: Serbo-Croatian, Slovene, Macedonian, Albanian, Hungarian, and Italian

Literacy: 70.3% (1961)

Labor force: 13.4 million (1971); 48.5% agriculture, 51.5% nonagricultural

Males: 5,605,000, of whom 4,525,000 considered fit for military service. About 201,000 reach military age (19) annually

GOVERNMENT (U/OU)

Legal name: Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

Type: Communist state, federal republic in form

Capital: Belgrade

Political subdivisions: 6 republics with 2 autonomous provinces (within the republic of Serbia)

Legal system: Mixture of civil law system and Communist legal theory; Constitution adopted 1963 and amended in 1967, 1968, and 1971; in early stage of development is a system of judicial review of legislative acts in Constitutional Court (a quasi-judicial body); legal education at several law schools; has not accepted compulsory ICJ jurisdiction

Branches: Parliament (Federal Assembly) constitutionally supreme; executive includes cabinet (Federal Executive Council) and the federal administration; independent judiciary; the state Presidency is a collective policymaking body based on proportional representation of all the republics and provinces, Tito presides as President of the Republic

Government leader: Josip Broz Tito, President of Republic and President of League of Communists of Yugoslavia

Suffrage: Universal over age 18

Elections: Federal Assembly elected every 4 years

Political parties and leaders: League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) only; leaders are President Tito and influential presidium members Edvard Kardelj, Veljko Vlahovic, Mijalko Todorovic, Vladimir Bakaric, Krste Crvenkovski, and Stane Dolanc

Voting strength: Voter participation in national elections has declined, as follows—1963, 95.5%; 1965, 93.6%; 1967, 89%; 1969, 88%

Communists: 1,025,000 party members (1971)

Other political or pressure groups: Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia (SAWPY), the major mass front organization for the LCY; Confederation of Trade Unions of Yugoslavia (CTUY), Union of Youth of Yugoslavia (UYY), Federation of Yugoslav War Veterans (SUBNOR)

Member of: CEMA (participates in certain commissions), EC (trade agreement with EC initiated 3 Feb. 1970), FAO, GATT, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, IHB, ILO, IMCO, IMF, ITU, OECD (participant in some activities), Seabeds Committee, U.N., UNESCO, UPU, WHO, WMO

ECONOMY (C)

GNP: $21.2 billion (est.) in 1971 (at 1970 prices), $1,020 per capita; 1971 growth rate approx. 9%

Agriculture: Diversified agriculture with many small private holdings and large agricultural combines; main crops—corn, wheat, tobacco, sugar beets, and sunflowers; generally a net exporter of foodstuffs and live animals; self-sufficient in food except for tropical products, cotton, wool, and vegetable meal feeds; caloric intake, 3,210 calories per day per capita (1967)

Major industries: Metallurgy, machinery and equipment, textiles, wood processing, food processing

Shortages: Fuels, steel, textile fibers, chemicals

Crude steel: 2.7 million metric tons produced (1971), 130 kg. per capita

Electric power: 7.6 million kw. capacity (1971); 29 billion kw.-hr. produced (1971), 1,405 kw.-hr. per capita

Exports: $1,816 million (f.o.b., 1971); 18% foodstuffs and tobacco; 17% raw materials, fuels, and chemicals; 24% machinery and equipment; 41% other manufactures

Imports: $3,253 million (c.i.f., 1971); 9% foodstuffs and tobacco; 26% raw materials, fuels, chemicals; 31% machinery and equipment; 34% other manufactures

Major trade partners: $5,069 million (1971); 71% non-Communist countries (35% EC, 6% U.S., 30% other non-Communist countries), 29% Communist-countries

Aid: Postwar credits extended mainly by the U.S. (about $3 billion, including grants and $700 million in military aid); Western Europe (over $950 million); IBRD ($585 million); IMF (over $400 million); Communist countries extended credits totaling $464 million in 1956 ($125 million drawing balance suspended in 1958) and $576 million during 1962-70 and $130 million in 1971; Yugoslavia has extended credits totaling about $600 million to 27 less developed countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America

Monetary conversion rate: 16.65 ND=US$1

Fiscal year: Same as calendar year (all data refer to calendar year or to middle or end of calendar year as indicated)

COMMUNICATIONS (C)

Railroads: 6,393 route mi.; 5,710 mi. standard gage, 683 mi. narrow gage; 463 mi. double track (1971)

Highways: 56,565 mi.; 14,850 mi. paved, 25,715 mi. gravel, crushed stone, 15,600 mi. improved earth, 400 mi. unimproved earth (January 1971)

Inland waterways: 1,278 mi. (1971)

Freight carried: Rail—88.0 million short tons, 14.2 billion short ton/mi. (1971); highway—78.7 million short tons, 5.0 billion short ton/mi. (1971); waterway—25.4 million short tons, est. 4.8 billion short ton/mi. (1971)

Pipelines: Crude oil, 200 mi.; natural gas, 580 mi.

Ports: 9 major (most important: Rijeka, Split), 24 minor (1972)

Merchant marine: 187 ships (1,000 GRT or over) totaling 1,472,890 GRT, 2,189,731 DWT; includes 5 passenger, 140 cargo, 17 tanker, 25 bulk

Civil air: 34 major transport aircraft

Airfields: 78 total, 25 with permanent-surface runways; 15 with runways 8,000-11,999 ft.; 2 seaplane stations

Telecommunications: Services available to public are limited but system as a whole is adequate; telephone and telegraph services are provided by openwire lines, multiconductor, coaxial, and submarine cables; radio and TV broadcast facilities provide coverage to nearly all sections of country; 26 main and 48 relay AM, 47 FM stations; 3,500,000 receivers; 25 major and 144 relay TV stations; 2,050,000 receivers; 820,000 telephones (97% automatic)

DEFENSE FORCES (S)

Personnel: (estimated) ground forces 190,000, naval forces 19,300, air force 11,000, frontier guard 14,000

Personnel in reserve (not on active duty): (estimated) ground forces 2,100,000, naval forces 36,000, air force unknown

Major ground units: 9 infantry divisions, 30 brigades (14 infantry, 1 mountain infantry, 14 armored, 1 parachute), 19 regiments (3 infantry, 16 antiaircraft artillery)

Ships: 1 destroyer, 5 submarines, 121 coastal patrol types, 97 river/roadstead patrol types, 30 mine warfare types, 45 amphibious types, 50 auxiliaries, and 200 service craft

Aircraft (operational): 399 (293 jet), including 133 jet fighters, 137 jet attack, 20 jet reconnaissance, 16 prop attack, 2 turboprop transports, 36 prop transports, 25 turbine helicopters, 27 piston helicopters

Missiles: 8 operational SA-2 SAM sites (42 launchers)

Supply: Produces general transport trucks, jet aircraft, weapons and ammunition up to medium artillery, explosives, small quantities of offensive and defensive chemical warfare materiel, signal equipment, and a small number of armored personnel carriers; builds small submarines, fast patrol boats, and units up to PC size; other materiel now obtained primarily from U.S.S.R.

Military budget: For fiscal year ending 31 December 1972, 11,731 million new dinars; about 48.4% of the central government budget



Places and features referred to in this General Survey (U/OU)

	COORDINATES			COORDINATES			COORDINATES	
	° 'N.	° 'E.		° 'N.	° 'E.		° 'N.	° 'E.
Adriatic Sea (*sea*)	43 00	16 00	Kikinda	45 50	20 29	Sljeme (*mt*)	45 54	15 57
Avala (*mt*)	44 42	20 31	Kladovo	44 37	22 37	Smederevo	44 39	20 56
Aegean Sea	39 00	25 00	Kloštar Ivanić	45 44	16 25	Sofia, Bulgaria	42 41	23 19
Alexandria, Egypt	31 12	29 54	Knin	44 02	16 12	Sombor	45 46	19 07
Aleksandria, Egypt	45 49	19 39	Kolašin	42 49	19 32	Spielfeld, Austria	46 42	15 38
Bačka Topola	44 51	21 20	Koper	45 33	13 44	Split	43 31	16 26
Banatska Palanka	45 18	14 32	Koprivnica	46 10	16 50	Srbobran	45 33	19 48
Bakar	45 30	21 00	Koršula	42 58	17 08	Stara Pazova	44 59	20 10
Banat (*region*)	45 26	16 54	Kosovska Mitrovica	42 53	20 52	Stara Planina	43 15	25 00
Banova Jaruga	42 05	19 06	Kotor	42 25	18 46	Struže	45 32	16 33
Bar	44 54	20 17	Kozara (*mts*)	45 00	16 55	Subotica	46 06	19 40
Batajnica	45 30	20 36	Kozare	42 56	22 06	Šumadija (*region*)	44 20	20 40
Begejci	45 27	20 27	Kragujevac	44 01	20 55	Svetozarevo	43 59	21 15
Begejski Kanal	43 13	22 19	Kranj	46 14	14 22	Szeged, Hungary	46 15	20 10
Bela Palanka	44 50	20 30	Kraljevo	43 34	21 42	Tekija	44 41	22 25
Belgrade	45 38	18 11	Kratovo	42 05	22 12	Tetovo	42 01	20 59
Beničanci	45 12	19 44	Krk	45 02	14 35	Thessaloniki, Greece	40 38	22 56
Bečej	44 49	15 52	Kupari	42 37	18 12	Timişoara, Romania	45 45	21 13
Bihać	45 54	16 51	Kutina	45 29	16 47	Tisa (*strm*)	45 15	20 17
Bjelovar	42 25	18 40	Lapovo	44 11	21 06	Tiranë, Albania	41 20	19 50
Boka Kotorska (*inlet*)	44 06	22 06	Latakia, Syria	35 31	35 47	Titograd	42 26	19 16
Bor	45 08	18 01	Lendava	46 34	16 27	Titov Veles	41 42	21 48
Bosanski Brod	44 00	18 00	Lipik	45 25	17 10	Titovo Užice	43 52	19 51
Bosnia (*region*)	46 13	16 55	Ljubljana	46 03	14 31	Tivat	42 26	18 42
Botovo	44 52	18 49	Majdanpek	44 25	21 56	Trebinje	42 43	18 21
Brčko	44 55	13 46	Mali Lošinj	44 32	14 28	Trepča	42 47	19 49
Brijunski Otoci (*isls*)	44 26	26 06	Maribor	46 33	15 39	Trieste, Italy	45 40	13 46
Bucharest, Romania	47 30	19 05	Međica	46 31	14 52	Turjak (*mt*)	42 51	20 02
Budapest, Hungary	45 24	13 59	Miljevina	43 32	18 39	Turnu Severin, Romania	44 38	22 40
Buzet	46 23	16 26	Mokrin	45 56	20 25	Tuzla	44 33	18 41
Čakovec	45 45	16 37	Monfalcone, Italy	45 49	13 32	Užka (*mt*)	45 17	14 12
Čazma	46 14	15 16	Moravița, Romania	45 16	21 16	Ulcinj	41 56	19 13
Celje	45 53	15 31	Mostar	43 21	17 49	Valjevo	44 16	19 53
Cerkije	41 51	21 44	Mur, Austria (*strm*)	46 18	16 55	Varaždin	46 18	16 20
Crni Vrh (*mt*)	45 09	19 43	Nagykanizsa, Hungary	46 27	16 59	Vardar (*strm*)	40 35	22 50
Crveni Čot (*hill*)	43 00	17 00	Nanos (*mts*)	45 48	14 00	Velebit	46 01	19 57
Dalmatia (*region*)	45 20	29 40	Niš	43 19	21 54	Veliko Greda	45 15	21 02
Danube (*strm*)	41 32	20 32	Nišava (*strm*)	43 22	21 46	Velika Morava (*strm*)	44 43	21 03
Debar	45 24	14 48	Nova Gorica	45 57	13 39	Velika Plana	44 20	21 05
Delnice	43 32	16 18	Novi Sad	45 15	19 50	Velika Tilva (*hill*)	44 59	21 00
Divulje	44 44	18 05	Novo Miloševo	45 43	20 18	Veliki Bački Kanal (*canal*)	45 52	18 52
Doboj	42 56	22 56	Novska	45 20	16 59	Veliki Jastrebac (*mts*)	43 24	21 26
Dragoman, Bulgaria	45 33	18 55	Obrva	43 48	20 36	Venice, Italy	45 27	12 21
Drava (*strm*)	44 53	19 21	Ohrid, Lake (*lake*)	41 00	20 45	Videm-Krško	45 58	15 29













Population

Persons per square mile
0 104 155 207 260
0 40 60 80 100
Persons per square kilometer

Land Utilization

- Forest
- Valley pasture and upland grazing

AGRICULTURE

- Most productive arable land, mainly corn, wheat, sugar beets, sunflowers, and tobacco
- Other arable farming, mainly cereals, orchards, vineyards, and livestock raising
- Mediterranean agriculture, including citrus fruits, figs, olives, and some vineyards



Beočin	45 12	19 44
Bihać	44 49	15 52
Bjelovar	45 54	16 51
Boka Kotorska (*inlet*)	42 25	18 40
Bor	44 06	22 06
Bosanski Brod	45 08	18 01
Bosnia (*region*)	44 00	18 00
Botovo	46 13	16 55
Brčko	44 52	18 49
Brijunski Otoci (*isls*)	44 55	13 46
Bucharest, Romania	44 26	26 06
Budapest, Hungary	47 30	19 05
Buzet	45 24	13 59
Čakovec	46 23	16 26
Čazma	45 45	16 37
Celje	46 14	15 16
Cerklje	45 53	15 31
Crni Vrh (*mt*)	41 51	21 44
Crveni Čot (*hill*)	45 09	19 43
Dalmatia (*region*)	43 00	17 00
Danube (*strm*)	45 20	29 40
Debar	41 32	20 32
Delnice	45 24	14 48
Divulje	43 32	16 18
Doboj	44 44	18 05
Dragoman, Bulgaria	42 56	22 56
Drava (*strm*)	45 33	18 55
Drina (*strm*)	44 53	19 21
Dubrovnik	42 39	18 07
Dugo Selo	45 48	16 15
Durdevac	46 02	17 04
Elemir	45 26	20 18
Évzonoi, Greece	41 06	22 33
Ferdinandovac	46 03	17 12
Gevgelija	41 08	22 31
Gdynia, Poland	54 30	18 33
Glina	45 20	16 06
Goli, Otok (*isl*)	44 51	14 50
Gojilo	45 29	16 53
Golubac	44 39	21 38
Gorenja Vas	46 07	14 10
Gospodinci	45 24	20 00
Gostivar	41 48	20 54
Gradsko	41 34	21 57
Grocka	44 41	20 43
Gruž	42 39	18 05
Hercegovina (*region*)	43 00	17 50
Herceg Novi	42 27	18 32
Hlebine	46 09	16 58
Hvar, Otok (*isl*)	43 07	16 45
Idrija	46 00	14 02
Ionian Sea (*sea*)	39 00	19 00
Iron Gate (*gorge*)	44 41	22 31
Istria (*peninsula*)	45 00	14 00
Ivangrad	42 51	19 52
Ivanić Grad	45 42	16 24
Ivaničko Graberje	45 43	16 29
Ivanjica	43 35	20 14
Jagodnja (*mt*)	44 20	19 18
Jagnjedovac	46 06	16 49
Janja Lipa	45 27	17 00
Jesenice	46 27	14 04
Julian Alps (*mts*)	46 20	13 45
Južna Morava (*strm*)	43 41	21 24
Kalna	42 52	22 26
Kanjiža	46 04	20 03
Karlovac	45 29	15 33
Kaštelanski Zaliv (*bay*)	43 32	16 22
Kidričevo	46 26	15 47
Kladovo	44 36	22 36
Knin	44 02	16 12
Koper	45 33	13 44
Kosovska Mitrovica	42 53	20 52
Kotor	42 25	18 46
Kozara (*mt*)	44 55	16 55
Kragujevac	44 01	20 55
Kranj	46 15	14 21
Kraljevo	43 43	20 41
Kranjska Gora	46 29	13 47
Kratovo	42 05	22 12
Krk	45 02	14 35
Kupari	42 37	18 12
Kutina	45 29	16 47
Lapovo	44 11	21 06
Latakia, Syria	35 31	35 47
Lendava	46 34	16 27
Lipik	45 25	17 10
Ljubljana	46 03	14 31
Majdanpek	44 25	21 56
Mali Lošinj	44 32	14 28
Maribor	46 33	15 39
Mežica	46 31	14 52
Miljevina	43 32	18 39
Mokrin	45 56	20 25
Monfalcone, Italy	45 49	13 32
Moravița, Romania	45 16	21 16
Mostar	43 21	17 49
Mur, Austria (*strm*)	46 18	16 55
Nagykanizsa, Hungary	46 27	16 59
Nanos (*mts*)	45 48	14 00
Niš	43 19	21 54
Nišava (*strm*)	43 22	21 46
Nova Gorica	45 57	13 39
Novi Sad	45 15	19 50
Novo Miloševo	45 43	20 18
Novska	45 20	16 59
Obrva	43 48	20 36
Ohrid, Lake (*lake*)	41 00	20 45
Okučani	45 16	17 12
Opatovac	45 16	19 10
Osijek	45 33	18 42
Otranto, Strait of (*strait*)	40 00	19 00
Ozren (*mt*)	43 18	17 36
Pančevo	44 52	20 39
Paračin	43 52	21 25
Peć	42 39	20 18
Petrovac	42 12	18 57
Piran	45 32	13 34
Pirot	43 09	22 36
Ploče	43 04	17 26
Podgorica pri Črnučah	46 06	14 35
Popovača	44 34	16 37
Portorož	45 31	13 36
Postojna	45 47	14 14
Prahovo	44 18	22 35
Prespa, Lake (*lake*)	40 55	21 00
Priština	42 40	21 10
Pula	44 52	13 50
Radinac	44 37	20 59
Raša	45 05	14 06
Rijeka	45 21	14 24
Rijeka Zaliv (*gulf*)	45 15	14 25
Rovinj	45 05	13 38
Rošaj	42 51	20 10
Šabac	44 45	19 43
Šandorovac	45 54	17 02
Sarajevo	43 50	18 25
Sava (*strm*)	44 50	20 28
Scutari, Lake (*lake*)	42 10	19 20
Senta	45 56	20 05
Šentilj	46 41	15 40
Serměnli (*strm*)	41 10	22 32
Sežana	45 42	13 52
Shkodër, Albania	42 05	19 30
Šibenik	43 44	15 53
Sisak	45 29	16 22
Škofja Loka	46 10	14 18
Skopje	42 00	21 29
Slavonski Brod	45 09	18 02
Tetovo	42 01	20 59
Thessaloníki, Greece	40 38	22 56
Timişoara, Romania	45 45	21 13
Tisa (*strm*)	45 15	20 17
Tiranë, Albania	41 20	19 50
Titograd	42 26	19 16
Titov Veles	41 42	21 48
Titovo Užice	43 52	19 51
Tivat	42 26	18 42
Trebinje	42 43	18 21
Trepča	42 47	19 49
Trieste, Italy	45 40	13 46
Turjak (*mt*)	42 51	20 02
Turnu Severin, Romania	44 38	22 40
Tuzla	44 33	18 41
Uška (*mt*)	45 17	14 12
Ulcinj	41 56	19 13
Valjevo	44 16	19 53
Varaždin	46 18	16 20
Vardar (*strm*)	40 35	22 50
Velebit	46 01	19 57
Velika Greda	45 15	21 02
Velika Morava (*strm*)	44 43	21 03
Velika Plana	44 20	21 05
Velika Tilva (*hill*)	44 59	21 00
Veliki Bački Kanal (*canal*)	45 52	18 52
Veliki Jastrebac (*mts*)	43 24	21 26
Venice, Italy	45 27	12 21
Videm-Krško	45 58	15 29
Vinca	44 46	20 36
Vinkovci	45 17	18 49
Vrbovec	45 53	16 25
Vrbovsko	45 22	15 05
Vrsoci	44 26	20 17
Vrpolje	45 13	18 24
Vršac	45 07	21 18
Vukovar	45 21	19 00
Žabalj	45 23	20 04
Zadar	44 07	15 15
Zagreb	45 48	16 00
Zastava	45 35	15 14
Zemun	44 50	20 24
Zenica	44 13	17 55
Zidani Most	46 06	15 10
Zirovski Vrh (*ridge*)	46 05	14 10
Zletovo	41 59	22 15
Zlobin	45 18	14 40
Zrenjanin	45 23	20 23
Zvornik	44 23	19 07

Selected Airfields

Batajnica	44 57	20 15
Belgrade International	44 49	20 19
Bihać	44 51	15 47
Cerklje	45 54	15 32
Dubrovnik	42 34	18 16
Ljubljana International	46 13	14 28
Mostar	43 17	17 51
Obrva	43 49	20 35
Prishtina	42 34	21 02
Pula	44 54	13 55
Rijeka/Krk	45 13	14 34
Sarajevo	43 49	18 20
Skopje	41 58	21 37
Split International	43 32	16 18
Titograd International	42 22	19 15
Tivat	42 24	18 43
Tuzla	44 28	18 41
Zadar	44 06	15 21
Zagreb	45 45	16 04



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



Summary Map

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